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Preface.
Growing up I often heard the phrase “Many hands make light work”.1 This was a
very formative phrase for me. The idea of everyone chipping in so nobody had to do
extra work made me happy. I don’t believe that I am alone in finding happiness from
group coordination and effort. After all, human beings are social creatures who generally
enjoy working together. Many people even volunteer their own free time to help others
out, for example when people help with church or a community garden. Yet why human
beings choose to help certain groups and not others is a major subject of debate. There
exists a large body of work spanning across many different fields concerning how and
when people form and participate in groups. Each different field has its own way (or
even ways) of studying and discussing cooperation.
All these different conversations build on each other to help make models for
decision making. For instance, psychologists may study how people cooperate
differently when their brain chemistry is altered and use this to find the areas of the brain
which strongly and weakly influence decisionmaking in different contexts. On the flipside
of that, economists may write mathematical formulae to predict, again based on very
specific parameters such as income, when people will cooperate or not. Throughout this
work I intend to present several mathematical models of varying origins in order to
clarify and discuss the instances where people cooperate with collective action.2 The
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Marcia Yost, the Goshen High School and Goshen College Choir Instructor and many others besides.
For more insight on non mathematical approaches I would recommend Meeting at Grand Central by Lee
Cronk and Beth L. Leech. They talk extensively about evolutionary biasing and the disconnects between
our evolutionary predispositions and modern society.
2
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purpose of this is to talk about how people talk about cooperation and to think about
how cooperation can be used to help our planet and us.
I am not going to begin at the beginning as stories and explanations tend to do.
The reason for this decision is that the story of the formal modeling of human
cooperation is a fairly new tale which is far from being clearly laid out beginning to end. I
am instead going to start this story by talking about one of the most formative and
widely discussed mathematical models concerning human groups and collective action,
Olson’s model. Olson’s model presents the idea that humans are rational,
selfinterested resource maximizers and so will not participate in large groups. From
there I am going to move onto more distal causes of success for collective action. This
will include discussion on the evolutionary causes for cooperation and how those
manifest in the modern day. The last model I will talk about is a little bit more modern
and deals with the idea of identity and how that plays into modeling human decisions.
The overarching idea behind the model called Identity Economics is that our internal
identity and socialized rules shape the way we make decisions. The very last section of
the book will be looking at some of the ethical implications for modeling. I will touch on
some of the assumptions present in all of the economic models I discuss as well as
discussing their implications for environmental efforts.
It is worth noting, I am limiting the scope of this work to groups that have already
formed and cooperation issues, not coordination issues. Coordination problems stem
from a lack of information while cooperation problems stem from the idea (that I will
challenge) that it is in an individual’s best interest to not participate (defect).

7

Chapter 1,
Olson’s Model.

The first model we will be looking at is Olson’s model which was first introduced
in 1965 in the book The Logic of Collective Action by Mancur Olson. His model has
been widely discussed, modified, and argued both for and against because of its wide
reaching application. Olson’s model also helped to jumpstart a mathematical approach
to collective action and so seems like an appropriate place to start our discussion.
In order to understand the origin of his thought process it is important to discuss
the context in which this book was written. Olson wrote The Logic of Collective Action in
response to the common ideas and rhetoric surrounding group action. Prior to The
Logic of Collective Action the “traditional”3 school of thought concerning groups and
collective action was that as people needed groups, they would form and use collective
action to accomplish whatever their goal may be. Put simply, Elinor Ostrom states the
traditional thought on groups was that they “tend to form and take collective action
whenever the members jointly benefitted”.4 Many scholars5 attributed the tendency to
form groups on a basic instinct for herding. This solely need based understanding of
group formation and action lead to a lack of consistency in discussing cooperation
between and within fields.

3

Olson The Logic page 17. He also mentions a distinction between “casual” and “formal” form of thought
on cooperation. This distinction is largely just that the “casual” thoughts on cooperation were that people
had a tendency or disposition towards joining groups. The “formal” definition argues that people forming non
kinship groups is a result of societal advancements and not an active decision of the individual.
4
Elinor Ostrom “Collective Action and Social Norms”. Page one in discussing how Olson’s work influence
the theory of collective action.
5
Olson lists Gaerano Mosca, Aristotle, Georg Simmel, and Arthur Bentley as a few.
8

Olson summarized the problems that he saw with this traditional view by saying
“Is it really the case that small, primary groups and large associations attract members
in the same way, that they are about equally effective in performing their functions, or
that they differ only in size but not in their basic character?”6 Here Olson is drawing
attention to other scholars’ lack lack of focus on to the differences between groups and
how they resolve collective actions. Formally questioning ideas such as this and
presenting mathematical models which illustrate the problems with such assumptions
helped make Olson’s work stand out. For example, after his question concerning the
types of groups that exist he goes on to discuss how it is easier to have successful
collective action in a small group because each member has a larger impact on the
success of the group. Which is drastically different than a large group where each
individual has relatively low impact and thereby he argues it is harder to succeed in
collective efforts.
As a quick example of the difference between Olson’s model and the traditional
thought, before The Logic of Collective Action it was expected that Tom would join the
AARP (formerly, the American Association for Retired Persons) if he believed in their
goals with only brief thoughts concerning other factors. The Logic of Collective Action,
on the other hand, asserts that his decision to join the group, as well as the success of
the group’s collective action, are based off of many different factors including but not

6

The Logic of Collective Action page 20. Here he cites Murray Hausknecht saying that the idea that
Americans are “joiners” is a myth. Basically to argue that there are differences between groups that can be
quantified in meaningful ways.
9

limited to, the economic incentives of joining, the group size, the goal of the group, and
the goals of each individual within the group.7
For the rest of this chapter I am going to and discuss Olson’s model not just the
context in which it was developed. Olson, as an economist by trade, is responding to
the “traditional” theory of collective action. In doing so, he explicitly denies the inclusion
of noneconomic factors in the decisionmaking process.8 It is also important to note that
Olson among others, took the word “group” to have a very broad definition, “a number of
individuals with a common interest.”9 This broad definition of a group has been one
factor which has allowed people to discuss and interact with Olson’s model in many
different fields and different contexts.
Concisely, Olson’s model states that rational, selfinterested people will always
seek maximize personal economic benefits. Thereby, it is unlikely that an individual will
contribute towards collective goods because their individual decision has little impact on
the group decision and they stand to gain by not contributing. This conclusion from
Olson’s model is referred to as The Zero Contribution thesis.10 It is derived from his
more general conclusion that unless an individual stands to gain more resources by
contributing than they would otherwise, they will not participate in collective action. This
model outlines a free rider problem which has been a subject of intrigue and study for a
very long time. A free rider problem is the problem where an arbitrarily large group fails

7

From here on out we are more concerned with what happens once a person has joined the group.
Although, he does state that social incentives could exist in the form of opportunities gained from social
standing.
8
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The Logic of Collective Action, Olson 1971, Pg 8. He presumes that groups have a common interest which overlap, but will not be
exactly the same as each member’s individual interests. His example is of union workers. Each individual worker wants better
wages, but also wants more income and so wants to work more hours.
10

Elinor Ostrom, “Collective Action and Social Norms” page 1 among others.
10

its goals because every person in the group has individual incentive to not contribute
towards the collective goal.
Olson’s model rests on the assumption that the human beings playing are
“rational and selfinterested”.11 From this he derives two primary points about individuals
in large groups (large meaning, groups where it is highly unlikely that their personal
actions will determine whether the group succeeds or fails) they are that, (1) the
individuals will primarily work to benefit their personal interests as opposed to the
12

group’s interests (free ride), even when they could collectively gain and therefore, (2)
individuals in large groups will not act to further the common goals of the group.
As an example of the tendency to free ride, Tommy’s town is attempting to clean
up a local river for people to swim and fish in. They are asking for each community
member to donate two hours of work so that they can knock out the whole project in one
day. Tommy being a rational, selfinterested human, reasons that his town is big enough
such that he can choose to work on his own lawn during those two hours rather than
contribute to the river cleanup so that he can enjoy both a nice looking lawn and a clean
river. This is called free riding. Free riding a primary issue that stops many collective
actions such as grassroots movements from succeeding. If one person skips out, it is
true that it won’t vastly change the outcome in a citywide cleanup attempt. But, if every
person uses the same logic then nobody shows up and nothing gets done.

11

The Logic of Collective Action by Olson page 2. He adds the qualifier that the following points hold “Unless the number of people
in the group is quite small, or unless there is coercion or some other special device…” In our familiar economic systems this coercion
manifests as making common pool resources exclusive. More on this in later chapters.
12
Olson page 2. By gain I mean that even if they would still benefit from cooperating, according to Olson’s model they will defect in
order to maximize their personal benefit. Since the group is large, the individual’s choice doesn’t matter so they want all the reward
with as little cost as possible.
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A common reaction to free riding is something to the effect of “well if one
professional shows up, or even several people who have some skill they’ll be more
effective than a town full of people who individually don’t have much of an effect.” In his
model Olson outlines three major types of groups.13 The groups are the “privileged
group” where one player has enough resources to pay for the entire product, the
“intermediate group” where there are several large players whose contributions towards
a public good (or collective action) would significantly reduce the other players’
contributions, and the “latent group.” The latent group is the group that we are
interested in; latent groups are defined as groups where no single player has enough
money to completely provide the good in question.14
In the privileged group the model states that because people are “rational and
selfinterested” the only time the good will be provided is when the privileged player
pays for all of it.15 The intermediate game is complicated and not discussed as much
because the abundance of variables. How many players make an impact, how much of
an impact do they each make, what are their individual incentives etc. The latent group
is what we are interested in because that is the group that is most impacted by free
riding. I argue that they are most impacted by free riding because privileged and
intermediate groups are frequently not the ones who are faced with the negative

13

Page 50 of The Logic of Collective Action by Mancur Olson.
The exact quote is, “It is distinguished by the fact that, if one member does or does not help provide the
collective good, no other one member will be significantly affected and therefore none has any reason to
react.”
15
I touch more on this in section 1b.
14
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consequences of collective action problems. In chapter 1b I will prove it is equivalent to
an nplayer prisoner’s dilemma as Hardin has also done.16
In order to better analyze his model and discuss the free rider problem I am
going to better define the context that I am addressing. I am looking into collective
action dilemmas where the group in question is arbitrarily large enough for a single
person’s decision to not matter. Their individual decision has such a small chance of
being the deciding vote that we can entirely ignore the chance of that happening.17 The
collective actions we are discussing concern a resource which is available to everyone
regardless of whether or not they contributed towards it. In economic terms this is a
nonexcludable resource. Like the previous example, if the town comes together to
clean a river, you can’t stop people who didn’t contribute from enjoying the clean river.
For an example of how Olson’s model works in the grassroots context, say our
community member, Tommy, has joined the AARP. The first step in Tommy’s decision
making process is to find out the cost, benefits, and the important details about the
group. By working with Olson’s model we are under the assumption that Tommy has
perfect information, so Tommy knows that his community is large and so he also knows
that the potential membership for the AARP is large. He knows that by joining he now
receives payments of $11 once a month. (This is, of course, entirely ridiculous because
if they were just throwing money at their members the group wouldn’t survive.) Because

16

Russell Hardin, “Collective Action as an N Player, Agreeable Prisoner’s Dilemma”. Published in 1971.

17

This is a common approach, Philip Pettit author of “Free Riding and Foul Dealing” (1986) is one such author who
takes this approach. Another is Hardin who has cited and published many reviews of Olson’s work.
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the community is sufficiently large we will presume that all of these numbers are static
regardless of the decisions of others within his community.
Tommy is an established member of AARP, but it has been a rough year for the
organization and come time for their fall pledge drive the organization is relying on its
members to staff the phone bank. It is in Tommy’s best interest that the AARP group
continue to exist because he gains economic resources from being a member (an
additional $11 a month). The issue preventing the continuation of the AARP is that the
AARP needs people to staff the phones while the drive is going on. Knowing that this is
an unpopular job, they offer $5 an hour to the members who work there.
Tommy must now make a decision: either work a part time job for $8 an hour and
trust that one of the other people involved will staff the phones, or staff the phones for
$5 an hour in hopes that the organization continues to exist. Olson’s model alone would
state that because Tommy is seeking to maximize the material benefit to himself (he
doesn’t care what others think) he would take the $8 per hour and whatever happens to
the group would have happened regardless of his decision. Unfortunately, based off of
this model all of the community members with the same opportunities and in the same
situation as Tommy would make the same decision and not participate. Olson’s model
would then come to the conclusion that, the group would not find the members
necessary to staff the phone bank and therefore, fail.18
There have been a number of critiques of Olson’s model which lie primarily with
his assumptions. Olson’s model rests on two broad assumptions about the players

18

It is common practice to take for granted that your group is logical and not solely altruists.
14
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involved. The first assumption is that each player in the game is perfectly aware of the
possible payoffs for themselves and each other player. The second assumption is that
each player is acting solely in their own personal economic interests. This means Olson
is explicitly denying the idea that any factors such as ideology, morality, or social
pressures can affect a person’s decision to participate.20 Although, several other
authors21 argue that other factors such as reputation loss or gain could be folded into
the cost or benefit defined within his model. It is worth noting that Olson wrote his model
with these premises so that he could avoid the idea that people to join groups because
people like to join groups which he argues is a meaningless conclusion.

Prisoner’s Dilemmas and Olson’s model

Olson’s model may not be the most uplifting of models, owing to any large group
being made up of free riders, but it has many uses! For further comparison and a more
complete analysis of the decisionmaking process, I will consider other economic models
and games. Economic games center on the principle of strategic interdependence.
Strategic interdependence is the idea that the end result for each player is dependent
on all of the players’ strategies.
Economic games are used to measure how often people will act in specific
scenarios given specific payoffs. A major game that is relevant to decisionmaking

19

Terry Moe, 1980, “A Calculus of Group Membership” page 594. Terry Moe is concerned about interest groups, but cites many
other authors who have noted the same concerns with Olson’s work.
20
Again, he does concede in chapter six that social pressures could be analyzed similar to economic goods but that is not the focus
of his work and so he does not include it in these considerations.
21
George Akerlof and Rachel Kranton develop a model based off identity which includes non economic factors that I will explore
later, “Economics and Identity” 2000.
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models such as Olson’s and the free riding issue is the prisoner’s dilemma game. The
traditional scenario is that two people have been caught for a crime but the police offers
each a deal in private. The deal is that if a person rats the other person out the person
who ratted out their comrade will have a drastically reduced sentence. So if one person
falls for the temptation and rats the other person out who keeps quiet the quiet one
become the sucker and must do a much longer amount of the jail time. This means that
if both people keep quiet, they are rewarded with only small amount of jail time. If both
people defect and rat the other person out then both people are punished end up in jail
for a long time. Because of this structure, the two player edition of the prisoner’s
dilemma deals with excludable goods, years in prison. That is an important distinction to
keep clear from our community action/grassroots action scenario’s nonexcludable
goods, water quality.
In our two person prisoner’s dilemma game each player separately makes a
choice whether to cooperate or defect. In figure 1 (pictured below) we have a payoff
matrix for a classic two person prisoner’s dilemma. The R value represents the reward
for mutual cooperation, the T represents the temptation to free ride, the S represents
the sucker’s payoff for cooperating when the other player defects (you did all the work
and the other guy benefitted) and, the P represents punishment for mutual defection. In
a prisoner’s dilemma the Temptation is the greatest payout because the player receiving
it, has not had to contribute anything to get it. The next highest payout is the Reward for
mutual cooperation where everyone contributes and everyone gets the payout. After

16

that comes the Punishment for both of you deceiving each other which could be greater
than or equal to the Sucker’s payoff for cooperating when your partner turns you in.

Individual/Individual

Cooperate (Contribute)

Defect (free ride)

Cooperate

(R, R)

(S, T)

Defect

(T, S)

(P, P)

Figure 1.1. A payoff matrix for two individuals in a prisoner’s dilemma game.

It is worth noting that in our grassroots scenario, the decision matrix for an
individual looks a little bit different. I am going to treat the rest of the community not as a
player, but as the sum of each player’s choice (minus the individual in question)22. This
will make the matrix look less like a prisoner’s dilemma and more like one person’s
decision matrix with the community taken as the background. Presuming everyone in
the community is the same, this will still help to describe how any one player should act
given the different possible outcomes. It is also important to understand that the
community’s action is still defined by the individuals within the community such that, if
enough people cooperate the task succeeds, but if not enough people cooperate, the
task fails and the community defects. Without knowing what the rest of the community
members will do the individual has to make his own choice based on the potential
payoffs.

22

This is a common approach which is also demonstrated in Hardin’s (1982) analysis of Olson’s work,
“Collective Action as an Agreeable nplayer Prisoner’s Dilemma.”
17

I am working under the presumption that the entire group is latent and that the
good is large enough that it cannot be provided by a single individual so if the
community defects the individual gets nothing whether or not they invested. This
changes the situation away from a classical prisoner’s dilemma because it means that
the sucker’s payoff for an individual is actually less than the punishment because it
means that the individual contributed towards the good but got no reward out of it, S <
P, P=0. It follows that each player in the community would have the same payoff
structure.

Individual/Community

Cooperate (Contribute)

Defect (free ride)

Cooperate

(R)

(S)

Defect

(T)

(0)

Figure 1.2. The decision matrix of an individual within the community when they
do not know how the rest of the community will act.

We are including only the individual’s payoff here because each member of the
community will have the same payoff structure regardless of how the community acts.
The left column of this payoff matrix is the same as the generic payoff structure in figure
one when considering only the individual. The right column has changed to contain a
zero because the individual is not participating and neither is anyone else. This means

18

that nobody is doing anything and so the good isn’t obtained and nobody can possibly
have any benefit or cost at all.
For an example of a game theory model in action we will once again turn to
Tommy’s situation. We are presuming again that everyone in the organization has the
same opportunities as Tommy and is motivated solely by material gain.23 Tommy knows
that he has two options, volunteer for AARP (cooperate) and receive $5 per hour, or
continue his part time job working for $8 per hour (defect). Tommy knows that every
individual in the organization has these two options and so, for the ease of
understanding, the rest of the organization will collectively either help enough to keep
the AARP going (cooperate) or collectively look out for their own best interests and not
help (defect). We are presuming the group is large it is very unlikely that Tommy’s
decision represents the decision which tips the scale one way or the other and so we
ignore that fringe case.24
Assuming Tommy cooperates, the options are either that he works for three
hours and makes $15 by helping, plus $11 a month from the organization, resulting in
$26 for himself. Or, the organization defects and Tommy would earn his $15 for helping,
while everyone else would get $24 working part time and the organization would fail. If
Tommy defects, he either gains the part time work money $24 plus the $11 for AARP
still existing netting $35, or $24 for the part time work. Given these two options and
purely rational, selfinterested motivations, Tommy should always defect. The payoff

23

Again, common assumptions when working with economic models such as Olson’s. See Olson’s idea of
a “rational selfinterested person” page 1 of The Logic of Collective Action.
24
This is described more in depth in chapter 1b but is a common approach. The chance of him being the
deciding case decreases as the number of people involved increases.
19

structure is such that he just gets more money that way (26+15) < (35+24).
Unfortunately, given the same opportunities as Tommy has, everyone else’s decision
matrix looks the same and as is predicted, the organization fails.

Tommy/AARP

Cooperate

Defect

Cooperate

($26)

($15)

Defect

($35)

($24)

Figure 3. Payoff matrix for Tommy and the community in the fundraising drive.
Clearly no matter what the community does, Tommy makes more money defecting.

The results of both of these modes of mathematical analysis (Olson’s model and
the Prisoner’s Dilemma) would suggest that people do not cooperate very often in large
groups.25 Small groups are a whole different story that Olson talks about but, I am not
going to do more than touch on. In small groups the individual cannot blend into the
crowd and so that creates accountability which has direct and indirect material payoffs
and benefits. In a small group the scenario where the individual is the fringe case
becomes much more probable26 which also complicates things. Think of the two person
prisoner’s dilemma, if one person defects and the other cooperated, the cooperator gets
punished. In a large group one person’s decision has little effect on the group decision.

25

This is the same result as an nplayer prisoner’s dilemma. Everyone seeking their own best interests
should defect.
26
For a more detailed analysis of small groups turn to Mancur Olson’s The Logic of Collective Action.
20

Yet, even in the context of a large group, our lived experiences would suggest
that the groups do succeed quite often. Think of community radio stations such as NPR,
or town cleanup weekends. Usually enough people cooperate for community radio to
continue to exist and for town cleanup weekends to be successful or else we wouldn’t
continue to try them out. Clearly there is a tension between our lived experiences and
Olson’s model. From here, I intend to pursue three different lines of thought regarding
mathematical models of cooperation, in order to see if they can better explain our lived
experience or even provide insight into how we can work towards resolving what
collective action problems we do face. There exists a large body of work centered
around adding different variables and changing certain expressions to make Olson’s
work more closely resemble our lived experiences. Ultimately, these changes to his
model are still based on his model and so do not offer a different perspective on these
issues. I believe that by looking at free riding issues from different perspectives we will
be able to provide a more well rounded description of the problem and consequently, be
closer to a direction for how to resolve the problem.
In the second chapter I will address another primary method of decisionmaking
analysis called iterated economic games. Specifically I will address the idea that we as
humans have evolved in a way which might have made us partial towards cooperation
because it served and continues to serve us better in repeated interactions. We have
fostered and grown our tendency to cooperate as both as a function of biology and
social structures. This section will explore ideas such as those presented by Bryan
Skyrms in his book Evolution of the Social Contract (1996). Skyrms among others

21

present the development of human interactions in mathematical models which
demonstrate the tendency for our idea of “fairness” to develop and the implications that
may have for cooperation in the modern day. In terms of Olson’s original assertion that
we are all rational, selfinterested material maximizers we are looking into the idea of
selfinterest.
The third chapter will be a more modern followup to Olson’s model called Identity
Economics. The idea presented here is that we can relax Olson’s original requirement
for motivations to be solely economic and include ideas centered around identity.27
Olson avoided this realm of analysis because he believed it would lead to an empty
statement that people like to join groups because people like to join groups. Many
others, such as Terry Moe28 or George A. Akerlof and Rachel E. Kranton29 have shown
that by relaxing the tight constraints on material goods that Olson puts on his model you
can create situations where people are more likely to cooperate. The difficulty here is
whether or not these models are truly predictive or if they are solely descriptive of
events which have occurred. Mathematically speaking, if you add enough positive
values together you can make some impressively large numbers, but that doesn’t mean
those numbers mean anything.
The final chapter will address the ethical implications and latent assumptions
within the economic models that I have presented so far. I will talk specifically about
what can be represented by money and what cannot or should not.

27

We are taking the material part out of rational, selfinterested material maximizers and replacing it with
the idea of maximizing a utility function.
28

Terry Moe, 1980 page 593. The first item listed in the abstract is “relaxing his original assumptions to allow for a broader range of
individual values and perceptionse.g., ideology, social pressures, and efficacy;”
29

The authors of “Identity Economics” which was published in 2000.
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Chapter 1b,
Olson’s Model and Game Theory.

All of the subchapters in this book will be more math heavy than the main body.
If that is your cup of tea then please, read on. If not, you will miss some of the finer
points but will still have the bulk of the conversation.

When discussing collective action issues in a latent group, Olson’s model is
equivalent to an nplayer prisoner’s dilemma.30 It is worth going through the
mathematics of their equivalence to tease out a better understanding of why this is true
and what it means for applying his model. Olson’s Model predicts that rational,
selfinterested people will always free ride in large groups. This does not create a
hopeful image for cooperation in grassroots movements and doesn’t seem to reflect all
experiences since some large groups do succeed. This discrepancy is worth explicitly
outlining and discussing to demonstrate how Olson gets to this result. He begins his
model by defining a number of variables and relations between the variables. The value
to the individual (Vi) he defines as simply “gain to the individual” 31 which, before Olson’s
strict restrictions, means that anything that can be perceived of as value could be added
into Vi but Olson explicitly restricts it to material gain. The relaxing of this restriction will
be discussed in chapter three. The advantage to the individual (Ai) is defined as Ai=Vi 
C, where C is the cost to the group. It is important that this is cost to the group and not
30

Russell Hardin, Collective Action as an N Player, Agreeable Prisoner’s Dilemma. Published in 1971.
The Logic of Collective Action. Olson, page 23. All of the variables defined on this page are contained
between pages 23 and 25.
31
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the individual because this is a model discussing nonexcludable public goods. These
definitions lead to the result that the only way that Ai could be positive is if one person
can pay for the entire public good and still have personal gain. For example of Ai, if the
good costs $8 but a player will get $10 out of it, they will provide the good to everyone.
If it costs $11 but no individual will get more than $10 out if it, the good will not be
provided.
Sg is the size of the group, it is important to remember that he defines anyone
with a common interest to be a part of the group. So in our environmental collective
action this could mean that the size of the group is rather large, perhaps an entire town
or larger depending on the scale of the environmental issue being addressed. The value
T represents the rate or level at which the cost or value is obtained. He also introduces
Vg which represents the value to the group. It is important to note that he defines Vg =
FSgT, where F=Vi/Vg. This means that Vg is the net value of all of the good being
provided which is a distinction from the idea of simply summing all of the Vi. F then
defines the fraction of the entire good that a certain player will get. If F and Vg are high
enough then the benefit outweighs the cost because an individual gets enough value
out of the collective good that they are willing to provide all of it. The relation between
these values is shown below in figure 1b taken from Olson’s book The Logic of
Collective Action.
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Figure 1.1b. Figure from The Logic of Collective Action which shows the areas where a
single player will be willing to provide the good, no cooperation needed. The red line is the cost to
the group of providing the collective good. The value of the collective good is shown in blue. The
black line is the value to the individual as a function of size of group, fraction of the resource that a
single player gets, and rate at which the good is provided. The places where the red line is
beneath the black line (c < Vi) are the situations when the good will be provided.

The terms commonly used for a prisoner’s dilemma game are R, P, S and, T. The
value R stands for reward which occurs when both players cooperate. The temptation
value, T, is the value received for free riding, or defecting when the other player
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cooperates. The sucker’s payoff is when you cooperate but the other player free rides.
The last value P occurs when both players defect. In a traditional prisoner’s dilemma the
payoff scheme is T>R>P>S such that S+T<2*R. The second condition means that it is
better to repeatedly cooperate rather than alternate between S and T.
I will be following a very similar argument to Hardin’s argument in “Collective
Action as an Agreeable nplayer Prisoner’s Dilemma” (1971). In order to demonstrate
how a prisoner’s dilemma results in the same situation as Olson’s latent group, we will
start by considering the situation where in the prisoner’s dilemma being played ten
people. The ten people are looking to provide a nonexcludable collective good which
has a two to one return on investment. So if all ten of them donate one unit they all
receive two units in return for a net increase of one unit per person. Technically as a ten
player prisoner’s dilemma the payoff scheme should be a 10 by 10 grid but I am going
to model the other nine players as a collective group who either cooperate or defect.

Individual/Group

Cooperate

Defect

Cooperate

(1+2,10+20)

(1+.2, 0+.2)

(+1, +10)

(.8, +.2)

(0+1.8, 9+18)

(0+0, 0+0)

(+1.8, +9)

(0, 0)

Defect

Figure 1.2b. The payoff scheme for a ten person prisoner’s dilemma.

This prisoner’s dilemma results in the most advantageous choice to an individual
being always defecting. Unfortunately everyone’s most advantageous choice is to defect
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and so we end up in the bottom right corner with everyone defecting. The Nash
Equilibrium32 is mutual defection because anyone who switches to cooperation will
begin to lose resources rather than having no change. This problem exists for any group
large enough for people to see their decision as not having an impact on the group’s
decision. If we changed the scenario to one where the good would only be supplied if
the group managed to get twenty units then we no longer have a prisoner’s dilemma
and the only logical choice for everyone would be to cooperate. The frustration with the
prisoner’s dilemma and Olson’s model is that if the players would change strategy they
could each get more resources out of it. The tension arises from each player seeing the
advantage to the individual if they free ride, but when everyone is free riding nothing is
happening and the advantage disappears. The answer where nobody is cooperating is
worse for each individual than everyone cooperating.33
For an example of how Olson’s model and a prisoner’s dilemma model plays out
in a real world situation we will consider a common well as a nonexcludable public
good. Two people all agree to share this common well. To cooperate in this instance is
to take only enough water for themselves while defecting is taking extra water which
could make life a little easier. One of these two people happens to be a hydrologist who
discovers that if they can reduce the amount of water they take by a total of 1% for the
summer then they will each be able to take 10% more come winter. We can presume
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The definition of a Nash Equilibrium “a stable state of a system involving the interaction of different
participants, in which no participant can gain by a unilateral change of strategy if the strategies of the
others remain unchanged.” Osborne, Martin J., and Ariel Rubinstein. A Course in Game Theory.
Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1994. Print.
33
This choice is known as being sub ParetoOptimal because it is not the best choice for everyone
involved.
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that each of them uses the well equally meaning each person consumes 50% of the
water drawn from the well. In order to match a 1% total reduction in usage in a single
player, that player would have to cut their usage by 2%. By Olson’s logic, a 2% cut for a
10% gain would be worthwhile for an individual. So it is likely that someone would
reduce their water usage thereby allowing everyone to use more come winter. The
difficulty comes from if there are were ten people who were sharing a well and the same
discovery is made (1% reduction in consumption for 10% increase) by Olson’s model it
is very unlikely that someone will reduce their consumption. A 1% total reduction would
mean that one player would have to reduce their consumption by 10% which would not
net a gain in water. While everyone would benefit if another player reduce their usage,
no player is likely to make that cut because they would not stand to gain from it.
The potential for cooperation exists in the 10 person well dispute, but by Olson’s
reasoning likely won’t happen because of the free rider problem. If any individual bears
the brunt of the cost then everyone else can benefit without paying anything and so
there is no incentive for any individual to bear any of the cost. Similarly in a prisoner’s
dilemma if we have ten people playing with the same structure, goal of net 1% reduction
meaning a player would have to lose 10% in order to gain 10%, the dominant strategy is
still to defect every time. Figure 1.2b shows the payoff structure for both scenarios as a
decision matrix. The top line of each box is all of the influences while the bottom is the
net result. The difference in costs is a function of the number of people participating
such that cost must always sum to 1% of the total usage. So as the number of people
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contributing goes up the cost goes down, 10 players contributing means that each
player only needs to reduce their own usage by 1%.

Individual/Group

Cooperate

Defect

Cooperate

(1%+10%, 1%+10%)

(10%+10%, 0%+10%)

(+9%, +9%)

(+0%, +10%)

(0%+10%, 1%+10%)

(+0%, +0%)

Defect

(+10%, +9%)
Figure 1.3b. In a ten person prisoner’s dilemma it is still advantageous for each
player to defect.

For another example of how these mathematical processes come to the same
result in a slightly different context, we will consider Tommy’s thought process
concerning volunteering for the AARP. We will start with Olson’s approach and then use
a Game Theory approach. This is the same argument as the previous problem but
rather than being focused on a public good this is talking about collective action. Using
the previous example of a phone bank34 and presuming again that everyone in the
organization has the same opportunities as Tommy and is motivated solely by material
gain.35 Tommy knows that he has two options, volunteer for AARP (cooperate) and give
up that additional $3 per hour, or continue his part time job working for $8 per hour
(defect).

34

See page seven or eight for the original example.
Again, common assumptions when working with economic models such as Olson’s. See Olson’s idea of
a “rational selfinterested person” page 1 of The Logic of Collective Action.
35
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Assuming Tommy cooperates, the options are either that he makes $15 by
helping, plus a net of $11 a month from the organization, resulting in a Vi = $26 for
himself. Or, the organization defects and Tommy would earn just his $15 for helping. If
Tommy defects, he either gains the part time work money ($24) plus the $11 for AARP
still existing netting $35, or just $24 for the part time work. According to Olson’s model
this would mean that the Vi for Tommy working is either $26 for a successful drive or
$15 for a failed drive while the cost for volunteering is either $35 for a successful drive
(because he could have earned $35 by working and the AARP continuing to exist) or
$24 (3 hours at $8 per hour.) Meaning the Ai for working is negative regardless of
whether AARP succeeds or fails. The Ai for free riding is always $9, $35$26 for the
organization existing or $26$15 for the organization failing. Thus by Olson’s model in a
latent group, Tommy always free rides. Tommy’s decision as modeled by a decision
matrix for a single person in the AARP looks the same because the cost and benefits of
each option are the same.

Tommy/AARP

Cooperate

Defect

Cooperate

$15+$11 = $26

$15+$0 = $15

Defect

$24+$11 = $35

$24+$0 = $24

Figure 1.4b. Tommy’s AARP decision modeled as a prisoner’s dilemma. Clearly
the dominant choice here is to defect regardless of what the group does.

Olson’s model has some limitations in that if we were looking at a privileged
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group it suggests that Tommy always free rides because the only way that the drive
would succeed is if one person could volunteer and cover all of the time but still benefit.
Aside from the physical challenges that would entail, the only way that Ai would be
positive is if that person had no other opportunities. Thereby just as Hardin stated36
Olson’s model in reference to an arbitrarily large group, like the one we’re dealing with,
is just an nplayer prisoner's dilemma. This means that for a large group the individual
choice is always to defect.
In order to fix the problem of free riding Olson’s model would suggest that we
somehow alter the payoff scheme for individuals. This could take the form of making the
cooperation more advantageous by offering special benefits for cooperation (even if the
good itself is still nonexcludable). That is the approach that many magazines or stores
take by offering special discounts for members or members only functions. In the
context of environmental work these special benefits often manifest as special events
for volunteers such as a park grill out. It would be difficult to make defecting less
materially advantageous since defection is inherently implying that that the person in
question is not taking any action.
The difficulty with attempting to resolve collective action through Olson’s model is
that you have to add material incentives to an existing prisoner’s dilemma. This requires
the collective action recipient to have material goods. In the context of a park or other
governmentally owned this has potential to incentivize people enough to come. But in
the context of water quality or air quality who is going to provide exclusive goods or

36

Hardin’s (1982) analysis of Olson’s work, Collective Action as an “Agreeable nplayer Prisoner’s
Dilemma.”
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opportunities to volunteers? These exclusive goods or services have to come from
some existing structure and many of the systems which are most at risk are at risk
because they do not have a preexisting structure,for example water and air quality.
This paints a rather bleak picture for cooperation in our collective
action/grassroots movement context. While there are some exaggerations from real life
in our scenarios for instance, there are probably people who volunteer that don’t have a
job to fall back on and so volunteering is the best material incentive, for the most part
this seems not too far off the mark. Yet, we see successful movements and successful
phone drives all the time. People even organize to solve collective action issues for
causes that do not have material goods to offer in exchange. For example, rallies to
protect endangered species or reduce emissions. In the next chapter we will look at
some of the more distal influences to cooperation and see how we have been
predispositioned for cooperation and how that impacts free riding.
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Chapter 2,
Distal Reasoning and Iterated Games.

The anatomical body of Homo sapiens, the bodies that we are most familiar with
have been around for almost 200,000 years. For reference, most cultural aspects of
humanity such as religious figures, musical instruments, and drawings appear first as a
package 50,000 years ago.37 Our society as we know it is relatively new in reference to
these ages. For example, agriculture as a human practice is estimated to have begun
about 13,000 years ago.38 265 years ago Benjamin Franklin began his experiments into
the connections between lightning and electricity. All of this is to say that human society
has rocketed forward as of late. The capacity to probe questions about why people
make decisions currently needs to be nuanced with a line of questioning into what the
more distal causes could be. We share very similar anatomical structure to our 200,000
year old ancestors and so there exists aspects of our brain chemistry which can
influence our capacity to cooperate.39 Similarly, humans have arguably gotten to our
point on the food chain, the top, not with brawn and brains alone, but with cooperation.
Olson’s model would say that people are rational, selfinterested, solely
motivated by material goods, and seek to in some way maximize these goods. In this
chapter I will demonstrate how rational, selfinterested human beings will cooperate in
iterated games to make sure that they gain the most amount of material resources. As
37

University Of Utah. "The Oldest Homo Sapiens: Fossils Push Human Emergence Back To 195,000 Years Ago."
ScienceDaily. ScienceDaily, 28 February 2005.
38
4 July 2013 issue of Science talked about how agriculture was invented multiple times.
39
“New evidence on testosterone and cooperation“ published in Nature by C. Eisenegger, M. Naef, R. Snozzi, M.
Heinrichs & E. Fehr demonstrated that under certain scenarios increasing testosterone increases cooperation as
measured by PD games.
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such, our bodies and our societies have evolved to encourage cooperation (for the most
part) because it is advantageous most importantly to every individual although it is also
advantageous to the group as a whole.40
This chapter is a brief venture into the lines of thought which dominate when
discussing the more distal causes of cooperation and their implications for modern
humans. The economic analysis from the previous chapter would lead one to think
nobody cooperates in big groups. Fortunately that is not the case! I am going to make
the assertion that the widespread nature of cooperation is owed to the advantageous
nature of cooperation for our distant ancestors. As it turns out when playing iterated
prisoner’s dilemma games it is more advantageous to cooperate. In the modern context,
this would suggest that a way to encourage cooperation is to engage in many economic
games with the same players. For example, if my housemate and I are frequently
snowed in it is more advantageous for both of us to always split the work rather than
trying to free ride all the time and having to take care of the issue alone ½ the time.
The advantageous nature of cooperating in iterated games of prisoner’s dilemma
would suggest that our evolutionary ancestors would have tended to develop towards
cooperation rather than away from it. Thereby shaping our modern bodies and
societies. Exactly how evolutionary tendencies have shaped cooperation is a new field
of study and as Ostrom stated in her paper Collective Action and the Evolution of Social
Norms “While no full blown theory of collective action yet exists, evolutionary theories
appear to explain the diverse findings from the lab and the field and to carry the nucleus
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“The concurrent evolution of cooperation and the population structures that support it” by Simon T.
Powers, Alexandra S. Penn and Richard A. Watson. In Evolution Vol. 65, No. 6 (June 2011), pp. 15271543
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of an overarching theory”.41 The overarching theory she is talking about is an
overarching theory of cooperation which we will come back to in the next chapter. The
focus of this chapter is to explore how the evolutionary theories begin to explain
cooperative behavior, I will go briefly into detail about how concepts such as fairness
become prevalent, how that influences an iterated prisoner’s dilemma game and what
implications that would have for a grassroots community looking to solve an issue
through collective action.
Before I begin I need to introduce the idea of an evolutionarily stable strategy,
ESS, which is a key concept for the rest of this chapter. A strategy is evolutionarily
stable when it can continue to exist despite being invaded by a differing, competing
strategies.42 Whether or not a strategy succeeds or fails the test of evolutionary stability
can depend on the which game is being played. For the purposes of this paper I will
discuss an iterated Divide the Cake game.
The Divide the Cake game is meant to represent the sort of scenarios which
would have been faced by Homo sapiens before cultural norms were established. To
start, imagine a game where we have three people in a room with one cake. Two of the
people are players and one is a referee. The players are then asked to split the cake
between the two of them, but there is a catch. If the two players demand more cake
than exists, the referee gets all of the cake. Similarly, if what they demand is less than
the entire cake the referee gets the remainder. The players can only communicate with
the referee and must make their decisions simultaneously. After a finite number of
41

Elinor Ostrom “Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms” page 138.
Maynard Smith first used the term in 1972 in the article “Game Theory and the Evolution of Fighting.”
Although the term did not become widespread until 1973 with the release of The Logic of Animal Conflict.
42
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rounds the players will reproduce proportional to the amount of cake consumed and
pass their strategies along to their children. In this way the population as a whole shifts
towards the most successful strategies.
A complication to this game is that the two players are picked at random from a
population of people with two different, well defined strategies. To start,43 there exists a
population of individuals who will demand more than half the cake, say 70%. If these
individuals only encounter each other, they get nothing. Thereby making the average
gain for each individual nothing. But if a small group of people start demanding 25% or
less, they will have more success than the 70% people because they are gaining cake
every encounter, even if it is only a small section of the cake.
This creates a situation where the 70%25% split in the population is unstable.
Consider what would happen if a slight drift causes some small chunk of the population
to demand 30%. While they wouldn’t get anything by playing with the 75% people, they
will do slightly better than the 25% because they will benefit more from interactions with
the 25% people and the 30% people than will 25% interacting with each other. Because
of this they will slowly push the 25% strategy out. If we consider this slight drift to be
possible for the 70% then increasing their demand will not be advantageous because
they will never receive any cake. This means that any drift that occurs has to drift
towards demanding less cake. There exists a similar scenario for the population
demanding 30%. If they drift towards demanding any less, while they will have some
success because they will always receive cake, it will be a decrease in cake received.
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This argument comes from Brian Skyrms’ book Evolution of the Social Contract. For more detail on the
specifics of the game and how it relates to justice check out his book.
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Thereby they can only drift towards the midpoint. This pattern continues until you reach
the equilibrium point at 50%. Our early ancestors who modestly demanded only half of
the hypothetical cake outperformed our more greedy ancestors and our timid ancestors.
Inclining us, their descendants, to also demand only half of the cake.
Unfortunately, the evolutionary stability of demanding 50% doesn’t always
dominate. In extreme starting conditions it is possible to fall into a trap of unequal
distribution. To illustrate what would make an extreme environment we will look at slope
diagrams of the population’s strategy over time. We are particularly interested in what
trends occur when this game is iterated and how strategies will develop given different
starting conditions. Skyrms uses the example where three strategies are present,
demand ⅔, demand ½, and demand ⅓, to create a Simplex Plot.44, 45 Every point all on
the diagram represents a ratio of the three strategies with each corner of the triangle
being 100% the respective strategy. S1 is the strategy of demanding ⅓ while S2 is the
strategy of demanding ⅔, and S3 is the strategy of demanding ½. Using the arrows on
this Simplex Plot we can see how the population trends over time.
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Evolution of the Social Contract by Brian Skyrms page 15.
Simplex Plot is the specific term for a three variable slope field as seen below. In other fields, such as
geology, these are often referred to as Ternary Plots.
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Figure 2.1 A Simplex Plot of the ratio of strategies over time. Given most starting
conditions the strategy of equal division dominates, but it is possible to be caught in a
trap of unequal division if few people start out with the strategy of even division.

As you can see from figure 2.1, most of the time46 fairness dominates.
Sometimes it may take longer to get there, but 62% of the time the entire population
ends up with the strategy of demanding half of the cake. This should accurately reflect
our lived experience because the tendency to split resources evenly was shown to be
widely prevalent in a simple study done by Nydegger and Owen.47 They asked two
subjects at a time to divide a dollar amongst themselves and the participants agreed to
split the dollar fifty fifty with their randomly assigned partner. This shouldn’t come as a
shocking result to anyone, but simply serves to show how our concept of fairness is a
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Using the Monte Carlo method Skyrms shows that this happens 62% of the time. The Monte Carlo
method is a technique used to find numerical answers to problems that are too complex to solve
analytically. It was named by S. Ulam in 1946. WolframAlpha http://mathworld.wolfram.com/MonteCarloMethod.html
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Nydegger, R. V. and G. Owen (1974), "TwoPerson Bargaining: An Experimental Test of the Nash
Axioms", International Journal of Game Theory3, 4: 239249.
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widely used and acknowledged strategy. Demanding half came to be so widely used
because it is an evolutionarily stable strategy that dominates now because it was
evolutionarily advantageous to our ancestors. Given equal starting grounds no strategy
can successfully invade a population where an even splitting of resources is prevalent.48
By equal starting grounds I mean that if we make a simplex plot of a divide the cake
game and start in the center (equal amounts of each strategy present) then the
population will always end up at everyone using the demand half strategy.
There do exist scenarios where fairness, or even distribution, does not dominate,
see figure 2.2. It is worth noting that this is still a representation of a divide the cake
game, but is one where all ten strategies are present in different proportions at the start.
In this instance a 6/4 split dominated because all 11 strategies were present at the start
(demanding 010 pieces) but only a small portion of the population started with the idea
of demanding half. So while this strategy started off by increasing in numbers, the 6/4
split was already dominant in over 60% of the population by 20% of the way through the
game.
It would be very unfortunate for people and our societal structure if there was a
large group of humans who went around demanding more than everyone else for the
same input. It is not difficult to see how this could negatively impact latent groups.49
Scenarios where such ideas might dominate occur most frequently when there are few
slices of cake available for division, the encounters are entirely random, and (if the
strategies played are fixed) there are few players starting with the demand 50%

48
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This is the definition of an evolutionarily stable strategy.
Here I am referring back to the latent groups discussed in Olson’s model.
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strategy.50 Fortunately, our ancestors to whom this analysis applies, would not have had
many random encounters as they largely operated in kinship groups and most divisions
of resources relevant to their lives would have not been coarsely grained. It isn’t too
hard to divide meat up amongst a large number of people. Especially if we aren’t
concerned about health standards.
That does not mean however that this problem didn’t occur at all. Our ancestors
assuredly ran into random people from outside their kin group which could have
dissuaded them from even distribution. One example of a game which demonstrates the
possibility for unequal distribution to develop is if we change the game slightly such that
all strategies exist at the start of the game. Figure 2.2 is an iterated divide the cake
game with ten slices of cake where a simulated population still fell into a trap of unequal
division.51 It is worth noting that the strategy of demanding 5 slices lasted a very long
time despite the strategy of demanding 6/4 split dominating from very early into the
game.

50
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Skyrms Evolution of The Social Contract from pg 16 note 25 page 115.
Figure 2.2 from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/gameevolutionary. Section 4.2 on fairness.
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Figure 2.2 This shows a scenario where, with very few individuals demanding
even split off initially, the trap of demanding an uneven split dominated. The initial
starting conditions were ⟨S0=0.410376, S1=0.107375, S2=0.0253916, S3=0.116684,
S4=0.0813494, S5=0.00573677, S6=0.0277155, S7=0.0112791, S8=0.0163166,
S9=0.191699, S10=0.00607705⟩.

When the population falls into an uneven split of resources it is commonly
referred to as a trap because it is harder to break out of once established. If we look
back at figure 2.1, it is the point where the strategies diverge from that defines the trap.
In our divide the cake game, if the population exists below the cutoff point for the trap,
fairness will not be established. One way to reduce the likelihood of these traps
dominating is to introduce the idea that people tend to prefer to play with others who
share the same strategy, which is again how our early ancestors would have operated.
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Skyrms introduces a parameter, e, which when set to 1 means that every interaction will
be with someone who shares the same strategy. When e is at 0 the interactions are
completely random as was the case for figure 2.1. The impressive part of this parameter
is that if we only increase the likelihood of interacting with a person to 10%, e=.1, then
we get a noticeably smaller trap in a slope diagram.

Figure 2.3. The same slope field as 2.1 but with the likelihood of interacting with
someone with the same strategy increased to 10% which has shifted the trap lower on
the diagram. Image from The Evolution of the Social Contract by Brian Skyrm.

We can see that just this slight increase in chance of meeting people with the
same strategy can cause the odds of developing a strategy of unfair division to
decrease. If we consider that over the past 50,000 years of culture most humans
interacted primarily with family units it is not unreasonable to think that perhaps the
likelihood of interacting with a person of the same strategy was still higher than 10%. If
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we increase e one more time by the same amount, .1 or 10%, to .2, then we completely
remove the chance of falling into a trap of uneven division as seen in figure 2.4.

Figure 2.4. No matter what the starting conditions are, the idea of even
distribution dominates all other strategies over time. Image from The Evolution of the
Social Contract by Brian Skyrm.

This bodes well for humans having similar ideas of fairness but how does this
relate directly to cooperation? The premise of this work is centered around how to get
everyone to work together. The two major ways to do this are through promoting
cooperation and punishing defection. Fairness works towards both of these ends
because when a person is not being fair it is often because they are refusing to do their
portion of the work, freeriding. Thereby, if our early ancestors could find ways to avoid
people who would not do their share of the work our ancestors would be better off.
Maximizing gains and minimizing losses by avoiding people who act unfairly
within repeated interactions in one lifespan can be seen through another game called
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the Ultimatum Game. In the Ultimatum Game participants commonly demonstrate that
choices are not solely based off of economic incentive but that there is a sense of
fairness to how we deal with strangers. Three German economists set up a game with
two players.52 Player one is given an amount of money known to both parties, and is told
to offer any amount of it to player two. If player two accepts the money player one gets
the remainder. If player two rejects the offer then neither player gets any money. Pure
economic incentivization would suggest that so long as player two was gaining money
they should accept, thereby, player two should accept any nonzero offer made by
player one. Yet in practice this is not the case. Low offers such as $1 out of $10 are
frequently rejected by player two as being unfair.53 This behavior hints at the presence
of a system of punishment for people who demand more than their share. Such a
behavior could be one function by which humans encourage cooperation by
discouraging noncooperation. The development of this behavior can be seen through
evolutionary game theoretical models.
In order to find the most successful strategies in iterated prisoner’s dilemma
games Robert Axelrod held a tournament. The tournament was set up so that each
entry would be a strategy for interacting with strangers in a series of prisoner’s dilemma
situations. Two strategies would interact for a random number of rounds and then switch
to playing different strategies.54 In order to succeed the strategy would have to
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Anomalies: The Ultimatum Game Richard H. Thaler The Journal of Economic Perspectives Vol. 2, No. 4
(Autumn, 1988), pp. 195206. This was originally shown by Schwarze, Schmittberger, and Güth.
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Tit for tat was a successful strategy written about in two pieces titled Effective Choice in Prisoner’s
Dilemma and More Effective Choice in Prisoner’s dilemma. Both were written by Robert Axelrod in 1980
and published in The Journal of Conflict Resolution.
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cooperate as much as possible while not getting taken advantage of, similar to the ideal
strategy for early humans. The strategy that demonstrated this ability was called
TitforTat, TFT. The titfortat strategy was the most successful strategy in two different
tournaments of prisoner’s dilemma games. The TFT strategy starts off by cooperating
and then just repeats whatever action the opposing player took. This parallels the
concept of fairness in that, the strategy is initially kind to players, but as soon as it is
taken advantage of it punishes back immediately. In iterated games of prisoner’s
dilemma this was the most successful strategy against many others including extremes
such as always defecting and always cooperating. TFT became so successful because
when someone is playing multiple prisoner’s dilemma games it is more advantageous to
cooperate than defect, R > (T+S)/2, if the opponent is cooperating. So it increased the
chance of mutual cooperation by cooperating initially. Yet if the opponent is non
cooperative, the TFT strategy also refuses to cooperate thereby the player is not getting
taken advantage of and so gets P rather than S. The success of this strategy suggested
that humans may follow similar strategies which was later shown to be true.
Most humans use either a generous titfortat strategy or a Pavlovian strategy.55
The generous TFT strategy increases its payout by having a certain percent chance to
cooperate on the next move despite the opposing player defecting. This increases the
chance for getting cooperation and prevents two TFT strategies from falling into a
pattern of mutual defection. A Pavlovian strategy is to cooperate on the first move. After
that, if a reward or temptation payout is received to repeat the previous action, if not
55

“Human Cooperation in the Simultaneous and the Alternating Prisoner's Dilemma: Pavlov Versus
Generous TitForTat.” Authors: Claus Wedekind and Manfred Milinski Source: Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, Vol. 93, No. 7 (Apr. 2, 1996)
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choose the opposite choice. This manifests as a strategy where if the player is doing
well they hold the course, but if they start doing poorly they change course. Both these
strategies would have been advantageous to our early ancestors because they
maximize benefit while minimizing potential cost. For example, a large group of hunters
could take down much larger animals and thereby gain more food than a single hunter.
So it would be advantageous for them to cooperate, but if a hunter were to not
contribute but still demand some of the result it would decrease all of the other hunters’
fitness. So refusing to work with a hunter who defected on the last hunt would increase
the fitness of all of the other hunters.
In the modern context there exists a common english saying, “hurt me once
shame on you, hurt me twice shame on me.” Suggesting that if someone defects once
and I just continue cooperating, it is my own fault for not being prepared for further
defecting. This saying follows from the ideas of fairness which influences TFT and
Pavlovian strategy. Similarly, games such as the Ultimatum Game would suggest that
humans disengage from people when treated unfairly. By denying people who would
seek to take advantage of others resources such strategies minimize the chance of
being taken advantage of by the same person a second time. These two strategies
(TFT and Pavlovian) are examples of the ways in which humans have sought to
maximize their personal resources within a lifetime. The following section will discuss
more specifically the mathematics how strategies come to dominate over generations.
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Chapter 2b,
Applied Models and What They Mean for Us.

The last section of this chapter will be addressing the mathematics of how
strategies are passed down and how different strategies dominate different
environments. The purpose of this subchapter is to discuss the mathematics of
economic models of evolutionary strategies more at length and to demonstrate how
they apply to our modern context.
One last game that can be used to model strategies of individuals over time is
the HawkDove game. Think of two prelanguage humans both coming across the fresh
corpse of a deer. The two humans each have two choices, either they can try to scare
the other player off by acting aggressive (the Hawk) or they can act passively to share
the meat (the dove). If only one player acts aggressive the other player will run off. If
both players act aggressively the challenge has been met and they start a conflict from
which only one player can win, incurring extra cost to both players, in order to obtain the
food. If both players act passively then the food can be peacefully split between the
players. Obviously each individual wants as much of the resource for themselves as
possible. The question is which strategy will be most effective over time and what sort of
factors will influence the success or failure of a strategy.
A single HawkDove game has the following payoff structure where V is the
resource to be split and C is the cost of driving another hawk off. We are presuming
here that each hawk has a 50/50 chance to win a hawkhawk encounter. Again, when
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the hawk encounters a dove the hawk wins all of the resource and when two doves
encounter each other they share the resource.

Hawk  Dove Game

Hawk

Dove

Hawk

½VC

V

Dove

0

.5*V

Figure 1. Hawk  Dove game showing payoffs for a player based on what the
other player chooses.

By applying an idea called replicator dynamics we can test the strength of the
hawk and dove strategies. This idea was seen earlier in the chapter in Skyrms’
diagrams and discussion but I will now go into the formal mathematics of it. The
equations and formalization of replicator dynamics was explained by Taylor and Jonker
(1978) and Zeeman (1979) in several research papers concerning prisoner’s dilemma
based economic analysis. The idea is that if we model the rate of change of the
proportion of a population using a particular strategy we can tell how that strategy will
fare in the long run.56 Strategies that show a greater increase in proportions of players
will outlast strategies that don’t grow as quickly. This is not at all different from our
previous discussion on passing down strategies between generations. The formal
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mathematical discussion of the replicator dynamics approach just allows us to discuss
how these functions work.
The underlying understanding here is that a good strategy will spread throughout
a population because players following that strategy will have a higher fitness, have
more successful offspring, than a bad strategy. We will use PH and PD to represent the
proportions of a population using the hawk and dove strategy respectively and W to
represent fitness levels such that a higher fitness means more offspring. Taylor, Jonker,
and Zeeman provide the equations pH ’=pH

WH
W

and pD’=pD

WD
W

which state that the rate

of change of the proportions playing each strategy is equal to the portion of the
population using a strategy times times the ratio of fitness of the people using that
strategy, WH or WD, divided by the average fitness, W = 1/2(W H + W D ) . This basically
means that as with our other models, the strategy that is more fit, has more resources,
will have better success propagating. If we take the the changes between generations
to be very small this can be rewritten as

dpH
dt

= pH

(W H −W )
W

and

dpD
dt

= pD

(W D −W )
W

. The

rewriting of these equations allows us to express the difference in rate of change
as the relation between each strategy and the average. This can be used to
show whether the proportions of each strategy are increasing or decreasing
relative to each other at a point rather than just showing their rate of change at a
point. Practically this manifests as those players who are fitter than other players
around them have more offspring and presuming again that the offspring use the same
strategy the strategy will spread or diminish.
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The next step will be to define what we mean by fitness. Fitness is defined here
according to the game’s payoffs. Whether or not they get the resource in question and
exactly how much of that resource each player receives. The fitness of WH is given by
the ratio of players using each strategy times the payoff for each strategy,
pH*F(H,H)+PD*F(H,D) or rather, WH=pH*(½VC)+PD*V. This means that the fitness of a
person using the hawk strategy is dependent on the portion of the population using the
hawk strategy times the payoff, which can vary for hawk on hawk games but is
generalized to the resource gain minus the average cost, plus the portion of players
using the dove strategy times the resource gain, V. The fitness of WD is modeled the
same way except with the payoffs for dove rather than hawk, pD*F(D,H)+PD*F(D,D).
This means that WD=pH*0+PD*.5V or that the fitness of the players using a dove strategy
only increases when there are more players playing dove.
These two equations demonstrate that so as long as the average cost, C, of
hawk  hawk aggression is less than the payoff ½V, the hawk strategy will successfully
invade regardless of proportions because WH > WD. A successful invasion means that
the the hawk strategy is more evolutionarily stable than the dove, this only happens if
and only if the average C < ½V. A situation where that would happen would be akin to
two humans coming across a corpse of a deer and engaging in conflict by attempting to
scare the other off without physically assaulting the other. For example, two people
having a shouting match over the last muffin at the bakery. The cost of that shouting
match is low enough to merit conflict over the resource of a muffin.
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If C > ½V then there is no dominant strategy between hawks and doves and they
will coexist. This would be a conflict where there is a large expenditure of energy
perhaps even in the form of physical assault. Two humans come across the corpse of a
deer and jump at each other in an attempt to damage the other person such that they
do not go after the corpse. The interesting aspect of this is that as the population shifts
towards more hawks, the average payoffs for hawks decreases and as the population
shifts towards doves the hawks’ average payoff increases. This means that the two
strategies would keep each other in check, neither ever being able to completely
dominate. This model does not take into consideration what would happen if the
likelihood of encountering the same strategy were increased because it is presumed
that the hawks want to encounter the doves to maximize their returns. The hawkdove
game shows how even with a common understanding of the concept of fairness, we are
not solely predispositioned to cooperate and thereby must continue to research the
evolutionary processes which reinforce cooperation.
This is also a good game to show how cultural evolution can influence us to
focus on cooperation rather than defection. In times before humanity regulated and
enforced common laws the cost of aggression could have been low. The only power
that would reciprocate an aggressive act against someone else would be the individual
aggressed and potentially their close kin. In modern society the cost of aggression has
greatly increased because of the potential punishment of fines, jail, or other legal
actions against an individual. There exists a system which discourages certain
aggressive actions through a larger power, the judicial system, than a single person
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could bring. A link between severity of punishment and crime rates has been shown in
modern societies suggesting that there is some correlation between perceived potential
cost of punishment and frequency of crime.57 This is not to say that if we make
punishment arbitrarily high all crime will vanish, merely to point out that societal factors
influence certain payoff schema in accordance with evolutionary predispositions. So if
we can increase the perceived cost of an act of aggression we can reduce the likelihood
of a person making an aggressive choice. This tendency to change payoffs based off of
context is frequently seen in other animals too. Territorial animal defending their territory
will be more aggressive and play the hawk against an invading animal who will more
frequently play the dove.58 By having different contexts for different strategies animals,
including ourselves, seek to minimize the cost of resource gain while still maximizing the
gain.
A strong example of how humans form strategies for different context lies in the
idea of in and out group biasing59. Similar to how territorial animals act with territory,
humans are more likely to cooperate with those they view as in group members and are
more hesitant to cooperate with outgroup members. The origin of this is related to
kinship theory which was first proposed by Dr. William Hamilton. Kinship theory focuses
on the fact that individuals share the most genes with close relatives and so increasing
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their fitness will also increase the likeliness of your genes being passed along.60
Strategies that promote positive familial relationships tended to do better than those that
didn’t because they facilitated cooperation within a group of people (increasing
individual fitness) and promoted the spread of the genes responsible for kinship
cooperation further propagating kinship cooperation. Suppose you have a group of
people all out seeking to maximize only their own fitness. If you have a small group of
kin working together they will have better payoffs because they can cooperate with each
other. By the prisoner’s dilemma mechanics R > (T+S)/2 so if a small number of people
can interact regularly, even if they occasionally get S by interacting with those outside
the group, they will still outperform the majority of people (the defectors). Because this
strategy is advantageous to individuals, in/out group biasing cooperation began to
spread.
The arguments thus far is that when we are placed into a situation that mirrors
the scenario which facilitated the development of cooperation we should be more willing
to cooperate/participate. This would mean that to inspire cooperation within our
grassroots community people should be primed with evolutionary signals for
cooperation such as kinship groups. This is a common tactic in many groups such as
greek organizations who refer to each other as brother and sister rather than just friend
or group member. By referring to nonkin with vocabulary that is traditionally reserved for
kin, for instance brother or sister, we should spark the evolutionary drive to cooperate to
some degree. Similarly, activities such as attending regular meetings could signal to
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others a predisposition for cooperation by demonstrating investment through extra cost
and serve to increase interactions between members of a group.
Most solely economic models would say that there has to be an increase in
material gained in order for people to cooperate in large groups. This is vastly different
than what an evolutionarily influenced model would suggest. In the conclusion of her
paper on collective action, Ostrom states “It is possible that past policy initiatives to
encourage collective action that were based primarily on externally changing payoffs
structures for rational egotists may have been misdirectedand perhaps even crowded
out the formation of social norms that might have enhanced cooperative behavior in
their own way.61” Incentivizing through solely economic means would not tap into the
evolutionary roots of cooperation. Elinor Ostrom is suggesting here that externally
changing payoffs may have even been detrimental.62
An evolutionary perspective on cooperation would suggest that for grassroots
communities to have successful collective action initiatives and thereby sustained
cooperative relationships, it is best if the initiative is centered in the community and not
externally imposed. A cooperative system which arises from face to face interactions
between people would tap into the roots of human cooperation that overcame the
potential economic incentives of free riding. Such a system would bode well for our
collective action but is far from a complete solution. In the next chapter I will discuss a
modern model of decisionmaking which centers on the idea that identity and social
context can influence payoff schemes.
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Chapter 3,
Identity Economics.

Olson’s model rests on the idea that people are rational, selfinterested, solely
motivated by material goods, and seek to in some way maximize these goods. This
chapter will focus on relaxing the idea that people make decisions based on solely
material approaches. This allows us to keep the idea that humans are rational,
selfinterested, maximizers but includes additional non material gains that were
previously excluded. In order to address this relaxation in a modern context I will
discuss an identity based model of decision making. The central point to the identity
model is that people make decisions not solely based off of economics but also their
social context. Part of the difficulty of integrating identity and economics is that this
model has roots in psychology and sociology which are fields not normally directly
connected to economics and also not normally quantized in the same ways. A further
difficulty in presenting this model is what the idea of social context means and how it
can possibly be related to economics. It is worth being upfront that this model is not
solving a free riding issue, but rather, including new values to the problem in hopes that
solutions to this model will shed light on decision making processes and thereby, free
riding issues.
By adding values of identity into economic games we can reshape the prisoner’s
dilemma to resolve the discord in one shot games between the seemingly
advantageous nature of freeriding and cooperation. If we take a traditional prisoner’s
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dilemma, figure 3.1, and add the idea that to cooperate is to match your perceived
identity while to defect is going against your identity we create a situation where we can
edit the values to have cooperation seem like the rational decision, figure 3.2. If we
have two players in a prisoner’s dilemma such that R=$4, T=$5, S=$0, P=$1 it is
evident that the only logical move is to defect. But now if we add in the idea that
cooperators are better people and receive a good feeling for cooperating (which is worth
more than $1) it becomes the obvious choice to cooperate because R=$4+A happy
Feeling, T=$5 (which is worth less than $4 and happiness), S=A Happy Feeling, and
T=$1.

Individual/Individual

Cooperate (Contribute)

Defect (Freeride)

Cooperate

(4, 4)

(0, 5)

Defect

(5, 0)

(1, 1)

Figure 3.1. A traditional prisoner’s dilemma.
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Individual/Individual

Cooperate (Contribute)

Defect (Freeride)

Cooperate

($4+ Happiness ,

( Happiness, $5)

$4+ Happiness )
Defect

($5, Happiness)

($1, $1)

Figure 3.2. An identity economics based prisoner’s dilemma where to cooperate
is to align with your perceived identity. So long as we value happiness more than $1, the
tendency for everyone is to cooperate.

The core of the identity model is the concept of identity. When a person acts in
accordance to their self prescribed identity they feel good and thereby gain utility,
increasing the value of that choice. When they act against their identity they suffer a
negative reaction and their sense of self identity is diminished. This could be as simple
as someone enjoying gardening and so they go and volunteer their time just because
they like gardening and not because they will receive any direct benefit. Many texts are
devoted to defining identity and all of the various factors that could influence identity so I
will define identity rather broadly as is fitting to the model.
Loosely speaking a person’s identity is flexible but well defined given specific
context. I may identify as many different things (hockey player, physicist, camper, male,
etc.) but in certain scenarios some of those identities may be more dominant than
others. Similarly a person has views on how other people should act based on that
other person’s perceived identity. If people act in accordance or against someone else’s
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perceived identity of them, they can influence the observer by affirming or denying the
observer’s assessment. In this way both a person’s actions and the actions of those
around them influence the identity model through reinforcing or undermining the
person’s perceptions. For the sake of simplicity we will presume that the preconceptions
about others are static such that any action taken would not remove the presumptions
that one person has about another. Meaning that in our example the social categories
assigned to people are constant regardless of action taken. This would correspond to a
situation where every individual is very confident about their own viewpoints. For
example, if I see myself as an environmentalist and I spend an hour volunteering to
clean a park then I would gain a positive selfimage from that. If I view my neighbor as
an environmentalist and they spend that same hour napping in the sun, I will suffer a
loss of selfimage because I would question if that is how an environmentalist should
act. I will not question their identity as an environmentalist because that is a think I feel
very confident about.
In order to better explain the analysis of this model I will delve still deeper into the
idea of identity. As I stated before a person can hold many different identities. This
makes a person’s identity flexible based on the context one can find themselves in. If a
person is with a large group of soccer players they may in that moment identify more
strongly with the soccer playing side of their identity increasing the likelihood that they
will behave accordingly. In this way one’s identity is flexible based off of one’s own
decisions. However, identity is determined not only by a person’s own self image, but
also by how those around you view you and how they react when you do not fit their
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preconceived ideas. For example, people are generally assigned to one of two
categories, either male or female and expected to act based on the assigned category
in specific ways. If that norm is broken because an individual (individual A) feels
differently than another person would assign them, the individual would benefit from
matching their self prescribed identity while the other person (individual B) would suffer
a loss in identity utility. This loss in identity utility by individual B may incentivize them to
react negatively towards the person who has broken the prescribed identity. See figure
3.3 in a few pages for an example of extended form and reactions.
Importantly, an individual’s identity may be influenced by another person. For
example, someone else may convince you that your view on environmentalism is flawed
and thereby you may change your view on environmentalism. This would change the
way in which you view certain actions and could influence future decisions. The
possibility for change means that your self prescribed identity is a function of not only
your actions and how they align with your views, but the actions of others and how they
align with and reinforce or cause discord and challenge your views.
The inclusion of identity into an economic model of decisionmaking is a very
important step and shouldn’t be vastly surprising. Many fields63 including psychology,
sociology, political science, anthropology and history already recognize identity as an
important factor in decision making. The difficulty has been in quantizing it. George
Akerlof and Rachel Kranton released a paper August of 2000 entitled “Economics and
Identity” in the Quarterly Journal of Economics which sought to add economics to the

63

“Identity Economics” by George Akerlof and Rachel Kranton pg 716. First published in the Quarterly
Journal of Economics in August of 2000.
59

list of fields which recognizes the value of including identity.64 The model that they
outline provides a way to incorporate important ideas regarding self and the social
setting into decision making games. A person’s decisions and ideas are influenced by
the setting that one finds themselves in. The setting consequently changes the results
of various forms of economic games by changing the payoff and cost structure. For
instance, if we take the situation described earlier where an individual received a happy
feeling for cooperation, figure 3.2, and reverse it so that the happy feeling comes from
defecting. This could be a context where the individual is encouraged to act alone or
simply doesn’t want to help whomever they are working with, which has the effect of
reducing the chance of cooperation. Including identity to an economic model could
therefore be a way to unite the various ways of discussing decision making and
collective action into a single, albeit broad, umbrella and create an overarching model
which could help to promote cooperation.
The mathematics behind this model are rather complicated for the purpose of
allowing other economic models to be folded into this one easily. As such, I will save the
technical discussion of the model for a subchapter and explain the model through an
example in extended form.65 The idea of identity economics is primarily that people
make decisions which seek to maximize a utility function. To start, we presume there
exist two possible activities, Activity One and Activity Two. These two activities are
polarizing such that if a person likes one activity they do not like the other. If a person
participates in an activity they like then they gain some amount of utility, V, if they
64
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participate in the activity they do not like they receive no utility. At this point it is easy to
show that anyone who is seeking to maximize their own utility would choose the activity
that they like.
The trick is that the identity model requires context to determine the value of an
action. So we will create an identity for all of the participants such that there exist two
kinds of people, green and red people. Everyone has been socially conditioned to
believe that green people prefer activity one and red people enjoy activity two. For ease,
we will assume the simplest division of people possible, everyone is green and knows
that everyone else is also green. By this standard, to participate in activity two is to be
not a green person and so anyone who does so would lose a sense of their self identity
(and anyone else’s sense of others identity). This loss of identity is based on common
psychology principles which talk about a sense of “anxiety that a person experiences
when she violates her internalized rules.”66
To give an example of how this model influences decision making, we have two
people who are a part of the society we just described. Person one is your average
green person who enjoys activity one. Person two sees themselves as a green person,
but really just enjoys activity two and not activity one. If player two participates in activity
two, player one is given a chance to respond. If player one responds then player two
may change their action. This results in the following extended form diagram.
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Figure 3.3. Extended form diagram of decisions within the green society.
The four possible outcomes of this game are then dependent on IO, Is, c, and L. IO
is the sense of identity one loses when another person challenges your perception of
them. For example, player one sees player two as a green person. This means that
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when player two chooses activity two player one is made uncomfortable and loses
utility. Is is the value for one’s self prescribed identity. Player two still sees themselves as
a green person and so engaging in activity two causes them some amount of personal
anxiety and thereby a loss of utility. The value c is simply the cost of responding to
player two. Responding incurs a cost because the player is reprimanding another player
and thereby taking an action that they otherwise wouldn’t have to take. The value for L
is the cost of the reprimanding as felt by the person being reprimanded. This causes a
loss in utility because it causes discomfort.
As a decision making model this is useful because based off of how we define
the various costs for different people we can create a diagram with specific payoffs. If
player two has perfect awareness of all of these payoffs they can then determine a
proper course of action. The first potential is that the self identity value is greater than
the utility for player two. This would mean that V  Is < 0 (or in another form V < Is) and
that player two should never participate in activity two. The next potential is that is that
the cost of responding to player two is greater than the loss in identity from having
player two deviate, Is < V and c > Io. In this case both players engage in their respective
activities without player one responding to player two because the cost of responding is
greater than player one’s loss of identity. The last two possible outcomes arise when the
cost to respond is less than the utility loss from having another person act differently, c <
Io. In these scenarios player two chooses activity two and then player one attempts to
discourage them from continuing in that course of action. Player one succeeds in
deterring player two if the gain in self identity plus the loss from being reprimanded is
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greater than the utility from activity two, V < Is + L. If the utility lost from player one
responding is not enough to deter player two, Is + L < V, then player two continues with
activity two. In short this means that you can influence people’s decisions by influencing
their self view and perception of others. If you want a more math heavy look at the
model see chapter 3b.
This is the simplest version of the game where everyone enters with the same
preconceptions and understands exactly the payoff structure. The difficulty with an
identity based model is that when we have more than one player we can also have
more than one set of preconceptions which can mean the payoff matrix can look
different for each individual. When different people have different payoffs for the same
decisions it can easily lead to conflict. Think of two people who value the same object
for different reasons. Maybe a father values an older car for the memories that he has
associated with it whereas a teenager may see the old car only as a potential method of
transportation. In this scenario the father is valuing the car’s existence without having to
use it while the teenager sees only an unused car. A situation such as this would likely
cause tension between the teenager and the father.
The advantage to an identity based model is that many different situations can be
modeled by it. You could easily talk in the abstract about how one’s identity influences
decision making in any context. The ability to apply this model in so many different
scenarios and with so many different influences allows it to be integrated more easily
with other existing models and for other models to be integrated within this model. For
example, a study discussing how other people’s decisions can influence our decisions in
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similar contexts could easily be used to talk about the ways in which our view on others
impacts our own decision making process through identity utility. The other major
advantage to this model is it gives us lines of research to follow up on. For instance,
what sorts of scenarios or steps can be created to maximize Is or Io and what sorts of
steps can be taken to dissuade people from deterring others? An example of research
into this can be found in chapter 3b after the more in depth mathematical descriptions.
The difficulty with models that seek to add additional values to the prisoner’s
dilemma is that they can be used to validate or describe anything if the values are not
properly constrained. Take figure 3.2 (reprinted on the next page) which includes the
idea of happiness. If we generalize this to a self identity value then we can demonstrate,
figure 3.4, how this change will influence a prisoner’s dilemma style pay off. If do not
limit the amount that the nonmaterial portions of the utility function influence the
prisoner’s dilemma then it has the ability to be worth so much more than money that it
takes the economic basis of decisionmaking out of the equation. As a prisoner’s
dilemma, if we maintain the relationships of the values such that T>R>P≥S, we can
arbitrarily inflate the value of defecting and still have it be a prisoner’s dilemma, figure
3.4. As far as economic value goes, both players should always defect even more so
than the original prisoner’s dilemma, $15>$4>$1>$0 has a stronger incentive to defect
than $5>$4>$1>$0. The complication comes from how unrestrained the value for Is is. If
we decide that to cooperate is to be in line with a person’s very core being, then it could
easily be worth more than eleven dollars to a person. Making the game not a prisoner’s
dilemma by changing it so the payoffs are R>T>S>P, $15+>$15>$10+>$1. By the same
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process, Is could be so bad that it makes it so a person never cooperates even when it
wasn’t a prisoner’s dilemma and they stand only to gain.

Individual/Individual

Cooperate (Contribute)

Defect (Freeride)

Cooperate

($4+ Happiness,

( Happiness, $5)

$4+ Happiness )
Defect

($5, Happiness)

($1, $1)

Figure 3.2. Repeated from earlier, a traditional prisoner’s dilemma with the
addition of the idea that cooperation makes an individual happy.

Individual/Individual

Cooperate (Contribute)

Defect (Freeride)

Cooperate

($4+ Is, $4+ Is )

( Is, $15)

Defect

($15, Is)

($1, $1)

Figure 3.4. A generalized prisoner’s dilemma where defection is even more
favorable than our previous example.

In order to demonstrate that this is a viable and useful model rather than just a
collection of arbitrary numbers which mean nothing, we must demonstrate that the
following assumptions can be met with some certainty. The first assumption is that
cooperation does in fact have some sort of nonmaterial benefit. I believe this to be a
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fairly reasonable assumption. I do not think it is particularly farfetched to state that
when people work together towards a goal they feel a connection with their coworkers.
Humans being social creatures usually derive pleasure from creating or strengthening
connections between people. When cooperating in a collective action a person is
working with other people, building connections, and thereby it seems reasonable to
state that they could derive joy from the experience. The relation between positive
feelings and cooperation is also an experience that many people have felt at some
point. Beyond both of these supporting statements, groups that are based on
noneconomic incentives do exist. This alone implies that there is something more than
solely economic decisionmaking going on. The difficulty will come from attempting to
constrain these values. In order for this model to be useful we need definite constraints
otherwise someone could just value happiness more than any amount of money and all
material assets lose meaning.
The second assumption is a little bit harder to address. The second assumption
is that the nonmaterial benefit is in some way commensurable with material benefit.67
There exist certain scenarios in which this seems like it could be a reasonable
assumption. As Olson mentions, in a community one could see social standing gained
from volunteering or working with collective action as a nonmaterial good which is
somewhat commensurable with material benefits. The renown gained from working with
people could translate to business deals later down the road or provide a positive
history upon which people could begin a cooperative business relationship. There exist
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a great many nonmaterial benefits which would be very difficult to commensurate with
material gain. For example, the happy feeling one gains from helping someone out with
a homework problem. How could we begin to equate the feeling of happiness or a
positive self image with materials?
If we can presume the second assumption to be right we are then faced with the
third and most difficult assumption present in this model. The idea that there is an
independent way of measuring nonmaterial benefit that is independent of the decision
making problem with which we are concerned. In order to prove that this model works
we would have to find a way of measuring the nonmaterial benefits in a non decision
making context. This would look like finding a way to quantify one’s mood or internalized
experience in terms other than relating it back to one’s own mood or internalized
experience. The reason we would have to quantify these in such a way is that, if this is
not met then it seems as though we have only showed that in certain decision making
contexts people will make specific decisions. Basically that certain amounts of material
gain or a strong enough identity are enough to influence the decision making process.
In order for this to be widely applicable we need to show that identity can be quantized
independent of material gain.
In order to determine whether this model has predictive worth we must consider
whether or not the values for Identity can be measured in any relative way. If we cannot
find a way to measure the identity values independently of economic analysis then this
model fails to predict anything and will solely remain a way to frame questions. This is
because if our goal is to solve a freeriding issue then we need all players to see
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cooperation as more valuable than defecting. If we add the value of identity to a
prisoner’s dilemma and have no means to quantify it then we can say that we have
solved the freeriding issue by just assigning it an arbitrary value large enough to make
cooperation always a better choice than defection.
It is my personal belief that this identity based model is a step in the right
direction. Using this model we can see that there exist certain influences which could
predisposition people to cooperate, much as we discussed in the previous chapter. In
fact, many studies have been done describing different scenarios in which people work
towards a common good. One such study is “Collective Identity and Social Movements”
which discusses the means and success of identity politics within late 20th century
United States.68 They even explicitly state that “the literature on collective identity still
leaves fuzzy the relationship between identity and an individual’s calculus of
selfinterest.” This is an important quote because it demonstrates the need to approach
this area of research and the strong link between identity and collective action.
Many books devoted to the idea of cooperation and collective action focus on
how to build common ground and a sense of belonging with your peers (sounds a lot
like building a collective identity to me…). The difficulty will be finding where that
exchange is between nonmaterial and material gain. The saying “every person has a
price” may be very true which could be good in the context of working towards a
collective good. The first assumption could be true even if not everything is
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commensurable. This would just mean that we would need to begin researching exactly
what is commensurable and why.
An important question that we haven’t discussed yet is should we be pursuing
these sorts of research and if so, what considerations do we need to make? Chapter 4
will delve deeper into some considerations about the impacts of economic analysis. The
following subchapter will delve more deeply into the math behind the model and
examples what I meant by research into the workings of the identity economics based
model.
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Chapter 3b,
Replicator Dynamics and Research.

The purpose of this subchapter is to go a little more in detail concerning the
mathematics of their model and how one could continue research into this model. I am
going to talk about how research could continue on this model by giving an example of
research that has been done which relates to the model and where that research could
go next.
First I am going to describe exactly how their model outlines the different
variables that they use. Basically, the mathematics behind their model is centered on
the idea that humans seek to maximize a Utility function Ui. (In relation to Olson’s
model, Ui would be equivalent to Ai plus whatever nonmaterial benefit is gained.) The
difficulty with this identity model is defining the relevant factors which influence Ui
because identity is such a flexible construct.
George Akerlof and Rachel Kranton propose the utility equation Ui=Ui(ai,ai,Ii)69
where Ii is the person’s selfimage and ai & ai are your actions and actions taken by
others around you. For instance, ai could be you volunteering to clean up a river and ai
could be your neighbor mowing their lawn. These are just vectors which have value
based off of the Ii. Through these actions your concept of identity influences the payoffs
of your actions as well as the impact of other’s actions on or around you. This gets a
step more complex when we begin to describe the selfimage. Selfimage they define as
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Ii = Ii (ai, ai ; ci, ϵi, P.) The first two vectors,ai, ai, are still the actions taken which can
have a positive or negative impact on your personal identity function based off of the
new factors, ci, ϵi, P. These three sets are all influenced by your physicality and your
social upbringing. In order they are the sets of social categories you belong to (ci), your
given unchangeable (or difficult to change) characteristics (ϵi), and your preconceptions
concerning social categories (P).
They define the set ci to represents subset of the set C (which is all conceivable
social categories such as man, woman, professional, musician, etc.) such that ci is all of
the categories that the individual ascribes both to themselves and others. This is an
important point for this model because it represents the idea that you are not only
judging yourself based off of your upbringing but you judge others based off of your
upbringing. Through these social categories conflicts can arise between two people
because they may have different preconceptions about the categories. For an example,
two people could both view themselves as environmentalists but could see the action (ai
or ai) of driving an electric car to work differently because of their preconceptions. One
may believe that they are helping to transition to cleaner forms of transportation which is
a positive action while the other may believe that they are simply reinforcing a system of
transportation which encourages urban sprawl and thereby is a negative action.
The set ϵi represents one’s own given characteristics which would include factors
that can’t be changed (or at least are not easy to change) including factors such as eye
color, age, skin color, or height. These often play a role in how you set your own social
categories, ci, and what social categories those around you place you in. The most
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important part of a person’s utility function Ui is their preconceptions, P. Preconceptions
determine how certain social categories should act in certain situations. It is how close
(far) one’s actions and characteristics are to P that corresponds to increases
(decreases) in identity. A person’s preconceptions are based on the social norms they
grew up around and can be influenced by other’s preconceptions.
For a quick example, Tommy wants to volunteer to help the AARP because that
is what he believes good AARP members do. In the context of identity utility this would
mean that the action volunteering, ai, has a positive value because he sees himself as
an AARP member, ci, and believes that that is what AARP members do, P. So even if
he would make more money by not volunteering, this model would suggest that the
identity value that he gains from volunteering could have enough of a positive influence
on his decisionmaking that it would outweigh the fact that he would not gain the money
from working.
The argument made in Identity Economics is that people choose to maximize not
only material gain, but also their own personal utility function, the personal utility
function is Ui=Ui(ai,ai,Ii) where Ii is the identity function. Neither the authors of the paper
nor I are going to argue about whether or not that choice is a conscious one. The only
important factor here is that people seek to maximize it and thereby act in ways that
match their preconceptions of who they are based on the categories they assign
themselves, ci. What this translates to is the idea that people are seeking to maximize
their received value from an activity. In order to do so they are going to pick the choice
that most closely aligns with their identity and how others view their identity so as to
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maximize their own utility function. As in the extended form example earlier, one
person’s decision may happen in part to appease other people because the loss of
utility from someone else reprimanding may outweigh the gain from doing what one
wants to do.
By this model it would be feasible to create a social structure such that we could
predispose people in certain situations to behave in certain ways. Again, this would be
similar to the ideas discussed in last chapter. As a hypothetical, if we expand our social
definition of family it could predispose people to care for a wider group of people as
fraternities and sororities do by calling each other brothers/sisters. If a person were
raised with the idea that good people always recycle, that may increase the utility value
of recycling and lead them to seek out recycling bins even when the choice would
otherwise not be favorable.
People cooperate in collective action scenarios when there exists no material
incentive regularly. One example of such is when people cooperate to provide a public
good such as a clean river. The identity economic model would suggest that they have
an increased utility payout for assisting with environmental work. An increased utility
payout would require people to see themselves or each other as belonging to a social
category which values environmental work. Several researchers, María A.
GarcíaValin~as, Alison Macintyrec and, Benno Torgler, all sought to prove that a strong
correlation exists between social norms regarding environmentalism in an area and
tendency to volunteer towards the same goal.70 Social norms are an aspect of one’s
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identity because they help to define a person’s preconceptions, P, by defining what and
which actions are expected by a person in a certain scenario. Working under the context
of the identity model of economic theory, their work describes a situation where the
people’s social category and preconceptions align to make the gain in utility from
matching their identity enough to cooperate despite a lack of economic incentivization.
In order to get a qualitative measure of social norms, which shape one’s
preconceptions, they used questions regarding willingness to give money or increase
taxes towards helping the environment. They then investigated the incidence of unpaid
work in environmental organizations. Their analysis spans both individual data sets from
32 European countries and countrywide data sets from 52 countries. The sample pool
that they collected from is very large and diverse and so they were able to control for
several different variables including age, gender, parental status, education, economic
situation, employment status, and political risk.71 This is important because it helps to
suggest that the study is truly getting at ideas of preconceptions and not just measures
of ability to volunteer.72 Yet even after controlling for each one of those variables
individually they were able to affirm that social norms regarding environmentalism do
correlate to a higher rate of environmental volunteering, including in low socioeconomic
areas although to a lesser degree than affluent areas. These results are suggestive that
social norms do play a role in decisionmaking and demonstrate the possibility of further
research into this type of modeling.

71

Political risk is an ICRG rating. Basically makes sure that the person is aware of government and not in
some totalitarian regime.
72
They found a positive correlation with available income and willingness to volunteer. They suggest future
studies include perceived willingness to volunteer time as a factor as well as money.
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I see the identity economics model as a means to discuss various studies from
different disciplines to create a more holistic picture collective action. The model is
formatted such that it would be easy to incorporate different aspects of identity and talk
at the least qualitatively, about the different impacts that identity could play in
decisionmaking. The premise of the model, that people make decisions based off of
their identity and social context is not new in any way. The trick is if it possible to
quantify it which I think could be done by looking into studies such as this one.
Economic analysis combined with psychology work could narrow down the potential
ranges for the different influences and could work towards finding cooperative solutions
for prisoner’s dilemma style issues.
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Chapter 4,
Ethical Considerations and Economic Analysis.

The ultimate goal of this work is to look at free riding and its relation to
environmental work. As such, it is important to understand all of the impacts and
implications of the models discussed here for the human beings that the models are
describing. The union of economic modeling and environmentalism has not always had
a happy outcome. It is exactly because of how rocky past this past is that we must
acknowledge and deconstruct the issues that have arisen. I am going to discuss the
assumptions in place for our, and many other, economic models and how those
assumptions impact environmental efforts. I am first going to address a real world
tension that arises from how we have historically approached free riding issues on the
large scale and then move into a discussion of the tensions regarding commodification
of nature.
This paper is focused on free riding issues and so it is worth looking at a real
world approach to free riding issues which concern traditionally nonexcludable
resources. A common approach in the western world (and many other places) is to
completely avoid the issue of free riding in nonexcludable goods by making all of the
goods excludable. For example, let us take something necessary for all human life,
water. (It is worth noting that this argument can be applied to other common pool
resources such as land and water.) If we look at water policy in the United States we
see that on the governmental level we have avoided the issue of free riding by charging
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for water. Thereby making water an excludable resource and sidestepping the entire
issue of free riding. This is common practice for all resources that can be thought of as
common pool in the modern world.73 Through practice, the move from nonexcludable to
excludable is demonstrating that there is no largescale way of handling common pool
resources. In other words, no way to have enough people cooperate in a prisoner’s
dilemma to preserve the resources.
The thought that we cannot solve this dilemma (except by the outside force
making them excludable) can be seen in explicitly Olson’s model. He states that
cooperation is unlikely “Unless the number of people in the group is quite small, or
unless there is coercion or some other special device…”74 The coercion he mentions
here is the system of making nonexcludable resources excludable which is currently in
practice worldwide. In making these resources excludable we run into the ethical issue
of access. In practice we demonstrate that only those with the economic stability to
access water, air, or land are deserving of those things. By valuing economic stability in
this way we are saying that humans have a specific monetary value they are worth
which seems problematic but I will touch more on that in the second half of this chapter.
Despite this singular approach taken on the wide scale, there exist other ideas
concerning dealing with the issue of free riding. There exist land trusts and systems for
managing water which don’t require outside coercion or people to pay per unit.75 As
humans have evolved, both socially and biologically, we have preferred to work together
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78

and through this, have expanded around the world. These cooperative biases that were
set up helped to shape a history of cooperation which if we can begin to understand we
can begin to build off of to foster more cooperation. The identity economic model is
certainly not perfect. But, if we can understand some of the biases that we have towards
and away from cooperation, we can use the identity economic model, or whatever
comes after it, to set up scenarios where people are cooperatively managing natural
resources.

Ethical Considerations of Goods

Several different moral arguments and assumptions play into the economic
models that we have been discussing. At the core of these economic analyses lies the
idea that all of the goods being discussed are in fact market goods which can be
assigned monetary value and traded. For example, when looking at Olson’s model if we
are considering whether or not Tommy will volunteer for the AARP we are comparing
the two different monetary values of his time. In our modern context the tradeoff of time
for money is taken for granted to the point where it is expected of people. Kant, among
others, would argue that there exist some goods which don’t relate to money. If Tommy
were to have to choose volunteering for the AARP and saving an unique local species
of birds, it would seem very strange to attempt to monetize the two activities. Kant
begins to address these differences in goods when he states “In the kingdom of ends
everything has either a price or a dignity. Whatever has a price can be replaced by
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something else as its equivalent;... whatever is above all price, and therefore admits no
equivalent has a dignity.”76 In this scenario, saving an entire species would arguably
have a dignity. There is no amount of money which seems comparable to the value of
life. While Kant’s distinction only separates goods into those that “have a price “and
those that have “dignity”, it serves as an example of one potential distinction between
goods. These distinctions are important because in our models we have been treating
all types of goods as ones which can be related back to money. Olson’s model requires
that we monetize them directly in order to fit into his analysis and the Identity Economics
model requires that their utility value be comparable to money. So because there exist
goods which we cannot relate directly back to money the decisionmaking models we
have been using break down.
When discussing a freeriding model in the context of environmental work there
are two main decisions with regards to how to handle nonmarket goods. One can use
identity economics (utility) style models to attempt to quantify the nonmarket aspect of
them as a utility function (which faces multiple issues), or one can refuse to engage in
the modeling process at all. The first option runs into some of the issues discussed at
the end of the chapter on identity economics (can we quantify the nonmarket aspects
of the good and can we then make that quantification commensurable with market
analysis) and so we will not discuss those issues further here. The second and third
options regarding how to handle economic modeling and environmental work requires
some discussion.
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Many environmentalist are split on the issue of quantification of nonmarket,
natural goods (specifically, things such as air quality, species, biodiversity, etc). Some
environmentalists view the capacity to quantize aspects of nature as a positive action.
The capacity to do so allows people to bring to the table a discussion of the
environmental cost in a concrete way which tends to make for a stronger argument.
This is especially true when the most important factor for the people you are discussing
with is the bottomline. For example, most governments and businesses use costbenefit
analysis to decide whether or not certain actions are worth taking and so the capacity to
quantize environmental changes can help strengthen arguments that otherwise wouldn’t
be heard because they have no economic value.
Many other environmentalists and philosophers see the capacity to quantize
aspects of nature as a primary issue with the intersection of environmental work and
economic analysis.77 The difficulties can be divided into at least two different camps,
issues with the type of value that nonmarket, natural goods have and issues with the
practice of assigning these values. The first issue is a similar philosophical issue to our
earlier discussion of types of goods. Nonmarket, natural goods such as other species,
views, and air quality are not the type of things that we have traditionally assigned
market values to. So problems arise when using an economic decision making model to
look at a person’s potential choices if volunteering to help better air quality in an area or
protect a species’ habitat. The tension in these decisions comes back to the idea that
we value different things in different ways and many nonexcludable resources (you
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can’t stop someone from appreciating natural goods such as a view, biodiversity, or air
quality) aren’t the types of things you can assign meaningful monetary value to.
Philosopher Elizabeth Anderson’s work discusses the idea of pluralism which in
this context relates to how we view different goods in different ways and how the
different ways of valuing don’t always translate. She discusses how certain goods have
different methods of valuing by stating “Some goods merit a particular mode of valuation
because they meet a standard of value: beautiful things are worthy of appreciation,
rational beings of respect... goods are appropriately valued in a particular way because
of their relation to the valuing agent, which makes them important to him.”78 She is
stating here that people value different things based off of different metrics which are
important distinctions because they do not always translate to other modes of valuation.
For instance, she explicitly denies their commensurability by stating that pluralism
“rejects the notion that the values of states of affairs can be globally compared.”79
By this philosophical framework equating certain nonmarket, natural goods with
market goods is to try to equate two completely different value systems which
straightforwardly, don’t translate. For an example, we will discuss volunteering to clean
up the neighborhood’s park. People value the park for entirely noneconomic reasons.
They may enjoy simply being in nature or perhaps the educational potential of learning
about ecosystems which would both be hard things to monetize. All while a city
developer may see that space as a potential site for new businesses. In this model the
comparison would be between the monetary value of an enjoyment of nature and
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potential educational value against the potential for new business. A foreseeable
counterpoint is the economic method of willingness to pay. Economists have ways of
measuring of how much a person is willing to pay based off of surveys or market data.
The measure of willingness to pay doesn’t necessarily mean that the determined
amount is representative of the value of the good in question. For an extreme example
to give a sense of the dilemma, think of a kidnapped pet. Say kidnappers have taken a
family pet and are demanding a million dollar ransom to return them. The family to
whom the pet belongs certainly want the pet back as it the pet is an important member
of the family. That being said, would they be willing to pay a million dollars for a pet?
How much would they be willing to pay is a function of many different values not all of
which can be related to money. You could find a value you’d be willing to pay to return
the pet but would that really be reflective of the pet’s value to you? Chances are it
wouldn’t be representative of the pet’s entire value to you.
The second issue that many have with the monetization of aspects of nature is
an issue with applying the idea of monetizing aspects of nature. The problem is that we
don’t entirely understand every detail of every ecosystem and how every variable
impacts every other variable. Three body problems in physics are incredibly difficult
because you need to address so many different variables at once. Similarly, it is
incredibly difficult to quantize every aspect of a decision and so we cannot know exactly
what impact an action will have. Natural systems are incredibly complex and altering
any small part could have no impact or it could completely destabilize the ecological
region. For example, a few degree warmer winter here in the midwest could just mean
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that not as many bugs die off over the winter, or it could mean that certain plants bloom
too early and die of frost altering the makeup of the primary producers in the area which
could have ramifications all the way up the food chain.
Even if we decide that it is fine to impact a certain natural ecosystem we must
consider how the disruption of that ecosystem will impact humans in the area. Or if the
initial environmental impact is slight we must consider the reverse, what impact will
additional humans trafficking through the area have? An example of how an ecosystem
disruption could impact humans is seen in portions of America near ecosystems with
many bears. Bears running out of wild space to hunt have begun turning to human
waste as a source for food and in doing so have begun to negatively impact human
settlements.
The last issue with the practice of quantizing environmental impact is that we
can’t just consider the immediate ecological and potential human ramifications but must
also think about how it will change the environment for future humans and nonhumans.
Different environments respond differently to human impact and it could take several
generations for an area to recover from impact. Any decision making models that
wishes to include environmental impacts must then be able to quantize all of these
factors for an extended period of time. Even a decision as small as cutting down a
single tree and replanting a new tree has a small impact on air quality in the area80 so
how can we know what sort of impact larger decisions will have immediately and years
down the line?
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The issues regarding quantizing life in dollars and the complexity of the models
which account for ecological damage are just two strands of the bigger moral issue
concerning the commodification of nature.When non human life is given a price and
natural resources are given prices (which may or may not reflect the damage caused by
their absence) we are led to the can’t or shouldn’t be commodified. Kant would argue
that things with “dignity” cannot be traded with things that do not, ie money. While what
goods exactly have dignity (or any other value which is not commensurable with money)
is hard to define, in practice there are few things that we have not assigned monetary
values to. Because of this practice we need to step back and discuss free riding
problems so that we may begin to stop the systemic devaluing of humans and in doing
so, address the question of what we should be commodifying.
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